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This paper presents a critique of several selected
studies in the areas of officer retention and grade struc-
ture. These studies are investigated to determine what
methods of approach and analytic techniques were employed
in accomplishing the objectives of the study group. An
assessment is made of the degree of success or failure
realized by each study. In discussing officer grade struc
ture studies, this paper also presents the factors which
are necessary to create an "optimal" grade structure, and
reviews the current grade structures and legal constraints
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I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this paper is to present a critical
review of selected studies in the areas of officer reten-
tion and officer grade structure.
The first area of investigation, the retention problem,
has been a continuing source of concern to all the military
services, and has been the subject of numerous studies on
many levels. With the manifestation of increasing pressures
for conversion of the armed forces to an all-volunteer or-
ganization, it has become imperative for the services to
develop methods for retaining a greater percentage of ex-
perienced and efficient officers and enlisted personnel.
The second major area of investigation in this paper
is the officer grade structure. The present grade struc-
tures have been established under ceiling constraints set
by the Congress and further amended by the service secre-
taries. However, during periods of severe fluctuations in
the total size of the armed forces, the individual services
have considerable latitude in adjusting their grade struc-
tures. A structure which is optimal for a total force of
a certain size may be far from optimal when the total force
is greatly expanded or reduced. Further, no clear cut cri-
teria for determining the optimal grade structure has been
established. For this reason, investigation of officer
grade structures poses an interesting and important question
In this paper, the method of review for these selected
studies involves three basic steps:
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1) Determine the objectives of the study.
2) Describe the techniques/methods of approach used in
the study.
3) Determine the degree of success or failure of the
study.
This approach will serve to take note of the different
origins and objectives of each study, so that the study may
be analyzed in light of its specific objectives. Also, a
knowledge of these objectives contributes to an understanding
of why a particular method of approach was used in one study
and not in another. Finally, it is possible at least in
some cases to judge the degree of success or failure realized
by the study. The criteria for judging this success will in
general be the degree to which the results and/or recommenda-
tions of the study have been incorporated into present pro-
cedures for improving officer retention or modifying the
existing grade structure. Another important criteria is
whether or not the study gives insight into the structure
of the officer personnel system, whether or not it pin-points
the important variables, and whether or not it leads to the
design of new or better systems.
The following major studies have been chosen as subjects
for this review:
1) Institute of Naval Studies, Study No. 13, Manpower
Considerations Applicable to the Navy in the 1970-1980 Time
Period
,
Annex B, Officer Survey, 1965.
2) Institute of Naval Studies Research Contribution #17,
Predicting Effectiveness of Incentive Programs for Various

Groups of Naval Officers , by Charles M. Harsh, 31 March
1966.
3) Office of the Secretary of the Navy, Report of the
Secretary of the Navy's Task Force on Navy/Marine 'Corps
Personnel Retention , 1966.
4) The Franklin Institute Research Laboratory, Career
Motivation of Army Personnel - Junior Officer Duties , 30
September 1968.
5) Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief
of Staff for Personnel, Officer Grade Structure Study . 1969

II. OFFICER RETENTION STUDIES
Studies in this field are generally undertaken to de-
termine factors which affect the retention of officers, and
thus to support manpower management programs by predicting
retention rates. In some cases, attempts have been made to
estimate the cost and effectiveness of proposed programs
for improving retention.
As an example of the type of results obtained through
officer retention studies, consider one finding of the
Institute on Naval Studies Study 13, Navy Manpower Considera
tions , 1970-1980. Results of the officer survey section of
this study indicate that the career intentions of a young
(age 25-27), married naval officer are generally more favor-
able than those of an unmarried officer of the same age.
However, these intentions are influenced by the officer's
wives' dissatisfaction. The survey also determined that
wives who want their husbands to leave the Navy are much less
concerned about income than about poor housing facilities,
medical care, frequent moves, and prolonged separations.
These results suggest a need for the Navy to concentrate it's
efforts toward improving housing and medical attention, re-
ducing the number of moves a family must make, and easing the
burden imposed by separation. Recent actions indicate that
increased attention is being directed toward these areas by
Navy authorities.

A. INSTITUTE OF NAVAL STUDIES, STUDY 13, NAVY MANPOWER
CONSIDERATIONS, 1970-1980 . [Reference 1]
This study was conducted in 1965-1966 as a follow-on
to the Institute of Naval Studies "Manning the Future Navy,"
Study 11, 1964. Study 13 represents an early attempt to ap-
ply the techniques of systems analysis to the investigation
of manpower problems. The modeling techniques and methods
of quantifying decision data demonstrate the value of the
analytic approach to studies in the field of personnel-related
research.
The primary objectives of the study were: [Ref. 1]
"(1) To study factors of personal characteristics, back-
ground and Navy experience which might be related to the re-
tainability of officers.
(2) To estimate the effectiveness of a variety of in-
centive changes as a means of encouraging longer active duty
:rs .
"
The study was of an exploratory nature, with the hope
that insights concerning the relevant factors could be util-
ized by the Chief of Naval Operations in the formulation or
review of policies and practices relating to selection, train-
ing, utilization, and retention of officers.
The method of analysis involved the use of a question-
naire to assess relationships between an officer's service
intentions and a variety of factors, such as family back-
ground, education, occupational and income aspirations, fam-
ily pressures, reasons for entering the Navy, types of duty,
satisfying and frustrating experiences, career objectives,
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comparisons of Navy and civilian life, and statements as to
how present service plans would be altered by the introduc-
tion of various incentive changes. The survey group con-
sisted of a stratified random sample of Navy officers (from
Ensign to Captain inclusive) , with membership composed of
10% of all Unrestricted Line Officers and 20% of all Staff
Corps and Restricted Duty Officers. Those completing ques-
tionnaires remained anonymous, and a total of 9350 question-
naires were returned from an initial mailing of 9980. This
constituted a representative sample of the active duty of-
ficer population.
The best retention criteria for officers was assumed to
be the officer's stated career intention, and it is upon this
critical assumption that the applicability of the results of
this survey rests. In any case, it was felt that an officer's
response to various proposed incentives could give a valid
estimate of the relative effectiveness of different incentive
programs. Using this retention criteria, the analysis was
mainly used to discover what factors differentiate among
groups whose career intentions are undecided, those who in-
tend to leave the Navy as soon as possible, those who intend
to retire after 20 years of service, and those who intend to
remain in the service as long as possible.
A total of 284 primary variables and 261 derived vari-
ables were established and investigated, then trivariate
analyses were computed for about 150 of the many possible
combinations of three variables at a time. Summary rela-
tionships between pairs of variables were generally felt to

be deceptive because of the confounding effects of other
factors, such as age, family, and career motives, so these
relationships were not used.
In this study a total of 13 specific retention incen-
tives were introduced and investigated. Each incentive was
introduced by asking the officer in his response to indicate
how this particular incentive would influence his present
career intentions . His answer was indicated by checking one
of the following responses:
a. Would greatly strengthen my desire to pursue a long
career in the Navy.
b. Quite favorably, I would continue active duty sev-
eral years longer than now intended.
c. Favorably; without changing my present intentions.
d. No effect on my service intentions or Navy attitudes,
e. Would make a Navy career somewhat less desirable for
me.
The study group estimated that the value of the incentive
was indicated by the percentage of officers choosing either
of the first two responses.
The attractiveness of the 13 incentives was then mea-
sured as they affected different career intentions ("Leave
Soon," "Undecided," and "Retire at 20 years")
,
grouping based
on rank (which was highly correlated with age) , and grouping
by designator (Unrestricted Line, Aviators, Supply and Civil
Engineer Corps, Medical and Dental Corps, etc.). Attrac-
tiveness was also measured as it appealed to other factors
of the officer population, such as source of commission,
10

family status, spouse's attitudes, income standards, and
Navy experiences.
Results of questions concerning these incentives were
displayed in the form of graphs and tables, and significance
tests between groups were tested at the .01 level or better
in order to determine if group differences or trends were
actually large enough to be of some practical importance to
the Navy. Trivariate analysis was used in the construction
of these displays. For example, analysis of an officer's
rank and career intentions was conducted versus attraction
of incentives. Primary attention was focused on officers
whose career intentions were "Undecided" and who were in
age group 25-27, as this group of officers obviously held
the most promise as a source or retention candidates.
Based on the responses to this section and previous
sections of the officer survey questionnaire, it was ap-
parent that the "Undecided" officer and the officer with
the intention to "Retire at 20 years" perceive many of the
same objectives and rewards of Navy life, while the "Leave
Soon" group generally have objectives which are not suited
to Navy life. In response to the 13 incentives, none of
the 13 held great attraction to the "Leave Soon" group,
while the "Undecided" and "Retire at 20 years" groups were
in substantial agreement in their responses to almost all
of the incentives. The implication was that while an in-
centive which appeals to the "Undecided" officer will offer
little attraction to the "Leave Soon" officer, neither will
that incentive cause any career motivated officer to decide
to leave the Navy.
11

In evaluating the responses to this portion of the
INS Study, it should be borne in mind that the percentage
of favorable replies to an incentive should not be judged
as the indicator of the absolute worth of that incentive.
In light of previous and subsequent studies of the same
nature, it would appear that at best the percentages give
a relative standing of the impact of each of the suggested
incentives
.
A survey method of this size is obviously an expensive
undertaking (the cost of this survey was approximately
$200,000), but an analysis such as this requires large sam-
ple sizes to ensure that the contingency cells contain large
enough frequencies to be trustworthy. In the same vein, it
was felt that cell frequencies would be too small to trust
when investigating multivariate relationships of four or
more variables simultaneously, and thus trivariate relation-
ships were studied almost exclusively.
One method of assessing the success of this study is
to note that many of the results were used by the Secretary
of the Navy's Task Force on Navy/Marine Corps Personnel Re-
tention in 1966. The outcome of the Task Force recommenda-
tions can readily be seen from the Secretary of the Navy's
specific action taken on each recommendation. Thus, some
results of the INS Study 13 were transformed from survey re-
sponses into implemented Navy-wide policies and procedures
in a rather short period of time. Referring to the previous
example on the attractiveness of certain of the 13 incentives,
the obvious preference of items involving an increase in pay/
12

compensation led to the Task Force's submission of 14 spe-
cific recommendations on improvement in the area of pay
and compensation; the Secretary of the Navy approved 12 of
these 14 recommendations.
However, it must be kept in mind that the study was
exploratory in nature and concluded by recommending addi-
tional study programs to:
1. Determine personal characteristics and experiences
related to effectiveness,
2. Determine combinations of incentives which would
best retain effective officers in certain categories, and
3. Develop officer feedback measures and other as-
signment criteria to increase officer satisfaction as well
as Navy effectiveness.
It should be noted also that the information presented
by this study can be used to give a fairly accurate estimate
of the retainability of officers, but it does not show the
best means of retaining those officers who may be the most
effective or most needed by the Navy. Therefore, the in-
sights gained from this study should be carefully reviewed
against a better criteria of officer desirability when at-
tempting to transform these insights into policy programs
designed to retain the most effective officers, or officers
possessing a particularly desirable skill.
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B. INSTITUTE OF NAVAL STUDIES RESEARCH CONTRIBUTION #17,
PREDICTING EFFECTIVENESS OF INCENTIVE PROGRAMS FOR
VARIOUS GROUPS OF NAVAL OFFICERS
, by CHARLES M. HARSH.
[Reference 2]
This study is an extension of the analysis of data
gathered in the officer survey portion of INS Study 13,
Navy Manpower Considerations, 1970-1980 . The study devel-
ops a method for estimating the effectiveness of various
officer incentive programs, and attempts to assign a rela-
tive cost to several alternative combinations of incentives
The objectives of the research contribution were:
[Ref. 2]
"(1) Develop a method for estimating effects on in-
centive programs, making allowance for continuance proba-
bilities for officers with different service intentions.
(2) Compare several combinations of incentives with
regard to their probable effectiveness in retaining offi-
cers of certain age and designator groups.
(3) Determine the relationships between incentive
appeal and Navy promotional criteria for officer effective-
ness .
(4) Examine the relative appeal of incentives for
officers with various backgrounds, career objectives, and
Navy experience."
The analysis used for this study relied on the data
base obtained in response to the officer survey portion of
INS Study 13. Additional computer runs subsequent to the
release of Study 13 provided the data for investigating the
appeal of incentive factors to career objectives. As in
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Study 13, the primary method of evaluating the effectiveness
of combinations of incentives was trivariate analysis.
This study recognized that some of the results of
Study 13 may have been distorted by the use of percentages
of members in each group responding to incentives, and at-
tempted to present a clearer picture by using actual num-
bers of officers who indicated they would extend service in
response to an incentive. Also, in attempting to establish
actual numbers of officers who would extend service, and
place some relative cost on the various incentives, the
technique of Continuance Prediction was developed.
Continuance Prediction is based on the assumption that
large age-groups of the incoming officer population behave
in a similar manner through time. It is an attempt to im-
prove on the criteria of stated intentions as the best method
of predicting how an officer will respond to various incen-
tives. The simplified equation for continuance prediction
is
:
LP.+UP +MP +S = N Alal au am a a+1
where L represents the number of officers in age group a
a
whose stated intention is to "Leave Soon," U is the number7 a
of officers in age group a whose intentions are "Undecided,"
M is the number of officers intending to serve for 6 to 16
a 6
years, S is the number who intend to serve for 20 years or
a
longer, and N .. is the number of officers continuing into
the next year group. It is desired to determine the contin-
uance proportions P.; i=l,u,m,s, to determine how many officers
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will continue into the next higher age group. (It is as-
sumed that P =1, i.e., all officers intending to serve for
20 years or more would continue to the next age group.) To
solve for the most likely values of P 1( P , and P , three' 1 u m
equations were written for the three age groups (20-27,
28-33, and 34-40), using values of l,u,m, and s from the
officer survey sample group (N had been shown to be fairly
constant for the previous eight years) . The three equations
were solved simultaneously yielding the continuance propor-
tions of P,=.044, P =.694, and P =.756. These proportions
1 ' u ' m f t-
do have an intuitive appeal as to what the officers in these
categories might be expected to do; therefore, these results
add credibility to the use of stated service intentions as
an indicator of actual behavior of officers. Using these
continuance proportions so derived, the effectiveness of
the various incentives can be judged with a considerably
higher degree of confidence.
On page 6 of Ref. 2 the author claims "phenomenal"
agreement when estimated N agree exactly with the actual N
when calculated from the equations. Since he is determining
an identity by substituting back into the equations he has
just solved, any disagreement could be caused only by arith-
metic errors
.
Using the original survey information on attractive-
ness of incentives to officer groups with different inten-
tions, and having estimated the probable continuance of officers
with different service intentions, the study then developed a
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method for estimating the probable gain in service exten-
sions which would result from several of the different in-
centive combinations. This expected number of extensions
within each designator and age group can be estimated by
the equation:
(1-PJE, + (1-P )E + (1-P )E = G J -v 1' la v u J ua *• m J ma a+1
where E n is the number of officers whose intentions arela
"Leave Soon" who say they would extend service in response
to this particular combination of incentives. E and Er ua ma
have similar interpretations for the "Undecided" and "Intend
to serve 6-16 years" categories in age group a. G 1 isa -*- J.
the probable gain in age group a+1 and the P, , P , and P
are interpreted as before. The term (1-P,) is used in the
equation because this is the proportion of the intention
group "Leave Soon" that otherwise would leave the service
were it not for the incentive. Therefore, the quantity
(1-P,)E, represents the number of officers in age group a
with intentions "Leave Soon" who now will extend service in
response to the particular incentive.
This estimation technique was used for many combinations
of incentives and their effects on different age groups and
designators. The results, in tabular form, show the esti-
mated number of officers in each designator and age group
who would be expected to extend service in response to a par-
ticular combination of incentives (e.g. Specialization and
Better Housing, or Civil Service Equivalent). With these
estimated numbers, it is now possible to determine the cost
17

of a particular choice of incentives. The study found
that in some cases, two sets of incentives which would ex-
pect to attract about the same number of officers may re-
sult in costs which are two or three times greater' for one
set of incentives as compared to the other. This type of
analysis represents a significant step in the introduction
of cost-effectiveness analysis into the field of retention,
and also provides a means for introducing different incen-
tive programs while keeping in mind both Navy requirements
and budget constraints. Hopefully, refinements of this
technique will permit the Navy to select and introduce (at
a reasonable cost) that combination of incentives which
will attract officers from a desired category without also
retaining too many officers in categories which are less
desirable
.
In summary, this study has contributed to knowledge in
the field of officer retention as a result of the develop-
ment of techniques for estimating continuance probabilities
and the effectiveness of several incentive programs on dif-
ferent age and designator groups. Cost-effectiveness anal-
ysis was introduced as an aid in attempting to attract
officers in a particular category while not attracting too
many officers in less desirable categories. No single in-
centive will accomplish each particular aim of the Navy, but
the study does suggest a method for developing trade-offs





C. OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, REPORT OF THE
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY'S TASK FORCE ON NAVY/MARINE
CORPS PERSONNEL RETENTION . [Reference 3J
This Task Force was established by the Secretary of
the Navy in early 1965 with the purpose of conducting a
comprehensive review and analysis of the factors affecting
retention of Navy/Marine Corps officers and enlisted per-
sonnel. The results of the Task Force were presented to
the Secretary of the Navy in the form of a series of recom-
mendations designed to improve retention. These recommenda-
tions were acted on by the Secretary in early 1966 when each
was individually accepted, rejected, or deferred for further
study.
The mission of the Task Force was: [Ref. 3]
"(1) To identify and examine the major factors bear-
ing on retention of high quality officer and enlisted per-
sonnel .
(2) To develop a plan for attacking these retention
problems which was to include:
a. specific recommendations
b. a program to implement the recommendations;
and
c. identification of the specific Government
officials or agencies who are presently empowered to imple-
ment such actions."
The scope of the study was extremely broad, to the ex-
tent that anything which would improve the naval service
could be considered as being a factor affecting retention
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and as such was a bona fide area of interest of the Task
Force study.
Major information sources for the study consisted of:
1. Fact finding by the Task Force members, including
major contributions from the Bureau of Naval Personnel and
Headquarters, Marine Corps.
2. Letters which were solicited from Navy/Marine
Corps personnel, their wives, and other interested persons.
3. Naval Personnel Survey 64-1.
4. Various Institute of Naval Studies efforts (in-
cluding Study 13, Navy Manpower Considerations, 1970-1980
,
which has been reviewed in this paper)
.
5. A National Opinion Survey conducted by Louis B.
Harris and Associates.
6. Symposia conducted by the Task Force members meet-
ing with Navy/Marine Corps personnel and their wives in
Norfolk, San Diego, and Quantico.
7. Other bureaus and offices within the Navy Depart-
ment ..
8. All major fleet and type commanders.
In addition, many special studies on more specific aspects
of the retention problem were either conducted especially
for the Task Force, or made available to the members of the
Task Force.
Two major mathematical models were utilized to assist
in the Task Force effort to relate the available data and
statistics to measures of cost and effectiveness, and the
20

trade-off between these measures. The first of the models
was the MARCIA (Mathematical Analysis of Requirements for
Career Information Appraisal) model, developed by the Bureau
of Naval Personnel, while the second model was one" developed
by the Task Force using the concept of productivity as a
measure of effectiveness, measuring costs in terms of pro-
ductivity under various programs with different retention
levels .
The first model, MARCIA, was designed to determine
steady-state impacts of changing promotion rates, career
ratios, continuance rates, and billet structure. The MARCIA
model is a computer-assisted linear programming model which
varies the input parameters of retention rates, length of
obligated service, and pay grade structure to produce an
output consisting of a rating structure by pay grade and
length of service to sustain required billets. Along with
this rating structure profile, the model indicates associated
costs and the values of effectiveness derived (effectiveness
measures were developed by the Task Force based primarily on
pay grade, rating, time in pay grade, and promotion factors).
The model produced an optimal solution which maximizes the
effectiveness to cost ratio. The MARCIA model was developed
to deal only with investigations of enlisted personnel re-
tention, and therefore will be discussed no further in this
paper. Appendix K of Ref. 3 describes the model in detail.
The second model, the Cost per Productive Man Year Model,
was also developed primarily for use in studying enlisted
21

retention. Considerable effort was expended attempting to
define and adequately quantify "productivity." This was
done by building a data source from the Navy's 3M Aircraft
Maintenance System, determining what productive work was
accomplished by men of different grade, different ratings,
and different amounts of experience in grade and rating.
This information was transformed into "utilization factors"
for development of productivity details which then became
a part of the Cost per Productive Man Year to determine the
cost of different Navy careers as a function of continuance
of the enlisted member. The model investigated inter-rela-
tionships among cost, production, and force size, and con-
ducted comparative cost analyses for alternative manpower
resource levels and alternative retention proposals, such
as sea pay for officers. The model and it's computer pro-
gram are further described in Appendix J of Ref. 3.
The study attempted to back up each recommendation with
mathematical analysis, but this was not possible in all
cases because of the inability to quantify all the factors
bearing on retention. In these cases, Task Force members
attempted to support their findings with logic and judgement.
The study effort was of such overall magnitude that re-
tention considerations were broken down into such subcate-
gories as personnel management, improvement, officer promotion
opportunities, officer distribution, education and training,
living conditions afloat and ashore, the image of the Navy/
Marine Corps, medical care, and pay and fringe benefits.
22

Each of these subcategories was the subject of an individual
study and analysis, resulting in recommendations pertinent
to that field of interest. It is not possible for this
paper to present all of the techniques employed by the Task
Force; however, some of the highlights are presented.
The officer retention problem was viewed from two
separate aspects; the quantitative problem, and the quali-
tative problem. In the quantitative area, the Task Force
studied stated requirements versus numbers of officers
available and revealed serious unbalances in several com-
munities at different ranks. The study delved deeper and
discovered that even in cases where there does not appear
to be a quantitative problem, some discrepancies exist. The
Medical Corps presents such a problem, where specialization
prevents officers of the same rank from being interchangeable.
The Task Force accepted the existing billet structure as be-
ing a valid representation of the actual needs of the Navy,
but pointed out that this structure should be investigated
further to determine if it is indeed valid. In investigating
the quantitative problems within the Navy and Marine Corps,
the Task Force did no detailed analysis of specific aspects
of the problem; it simply presented the statistics revealing
the number of billets and the number of officers presently
available in each grade and branch of the service, and then
drew attention to those areas where chronic imbalances existed.
Problems of a qualitative nature were also found to exist.
Selectivity for promotion has been considerably reduced for
middle grade officers, and has yielded some undesirable effects
23

In addition, technological advancements indicate that a
greater need currently exists to maintain a high quality-
officer community by improving management in the fields of
career planning, education, and utilization of officer
abilities
.
In the area of officer promotion opportunities , the
Task Force recommended a series of proposals with the in-
tention of streamlining the promotion procedure, permitting
accelerated promotions for more promising officers, and
providing for greater authority to selectively noncontinue
some senior officers. The most far reaching of the recom-
mendations was the call for adoption of a Distribution Zone
Promotion Plan. This plan was developed through extensive
data collection and analysis of previous promotion patterns,
and was then presented in the form of recommended selection
and attrition rates based on years of completed commissioned
service for different officer communities (i.e., Unrestricted
Line, Supply Corps, Civil Engineer Corps, etc.). The major
objective of this and other recommendations concerning pro-
motion opportunities was to increase retention and pride in
the Navy officer corps by demonstrating recognition of su-
perior performance through accelerated promotion and assign-
ment to key billets. Although the motivation for the development
of the Distribution Zone Promotion and other promotion recom-
mendations was to improve retention through rewarding su-
perior performance, no analysis was conducted to determine
exactly what effect these actions would have in terms of the
quantity and quality of officers retained.
24

Personnel surveys conducted in 1964 and 1965 provided
some of the data and pointed the direction to some of the
Task Force recommendations in the areas of officer distri-
bution, training, education, living conditions, image,
medical care, and pay and fringe benefits. Wherever pos-
sible, the Task Force attempted to assign costs to the
recommendations presented. In some areas (promotion, of-
ficer distribution and management, and image), the costs of
changes were minimal. However, sizable funding would be
required in order to implement recommendations in the fields
of officer education and training, living conditions, medi-
cal care, and pay. Preparation of cost data constituted
some of the most concrete analysis undertakings of the study.
Another analytical contribution to the study was the
set of statistical studies developed for Navy enlisted per-
sonnel, Navy officers, and Marine Corps officer and enlisted
personnel. These studies provided an overview of the sta-
tistical picture of these groups. This includes data on
grade strength, promotion and procurement experiences, re-
tention experiences, and comparisons of present structures
with the "ideal" structures as envisioned by law and bil-
lets as presently established. Conclusions have been drawn
from certain of these statistical studies in the sub-cate-
gories of the overall Task Force study.
The Task Force established a Technical Support Group for
the purpose of developing analytical techniques and methodo-
logy to permit testing and refining of Task Force recommen-
dations. Most of the techniques developed, such as continuance
25

rate models, were applied to enlisted retention considera-
tions. However, considerable effort was also expended in
the development of the cost and effectiveness models men-
tioned previously. Additionally, many retention factors
were categorized in the economic framework of supply and
demand
.
The efforts associated with the analytical aspects of
this study did not end with the publishing of the final
report and dissolution of the Task Force. In fact, efforts
in the area of methods of analysis were still expanding and
pointed out further work to be done. Problems encountered
in the study indicated that further studies were needed in
such areas as:
(1) Determination of manpower requirements and inven-
tories, along with points of imbalance between the two.
(2) Methods of measurement and control of the supply
of personnel entering or continuing in the system.
(3) Developing and utilizing manpower management in-
formation systems.
(4) Development of information sources.
In accomplishing it's mission, the Task Force's recommenda-
tions by and large received considerable approval from the
Secretary of the Navy. Most of the recommendations which
were not approved were either disapproved because of budget
limitations or were deferred pending further study. To the
extent that implementation of recommendations represents the
mark of success of this Task Force, it must be considered
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A total of 4532 officers, stationed both overseas and
in the United States, took part in this study. This offi-
cer sample group represented a stratified two stage selec-
tion with primary stratification across branches (i.e.,
Infantry, Artillery, Engineer, Chemical, etc.) and supple-
mentary stratification across ranks (Captain, First Lieu-
tenant, Second Lieutenant). The data collection was
accomplished through group-administered questionnaires in
the United States, and a mailed survey for the overseas
subjects. All subjects remained anonymous.
The questionnaire required between 312 and 389 separate
numerical responses by each officer, depending on his ser-
vice status and career convictions. Space was provided for
written comments at the end of the questionnaire and more
than one-third of the subjects submitted some comments.
Additionally, informal discussions were held by interview-
ers with participants in the United States. These discus-
sions, which were not mandatory for the participants, were
used to further investigate the attitudes and reactions of
the officers. A pilot interview program was undertaken
which resulted in removal of some ambiguity and streamlin-
ing the form of the questionnaire actually administered to
the participants of the main study. In addition, a valida-
tion study consisting of a mail sample of 113 officers who
had been separated from the Army in the past two years was
undertaken. The purpose of this validation was to gain a
different perspective of the retention problem and perhaps
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point out possible contradictions or biases which would limit
the value of the main study findings.
The questionnaire and study effort were organized in
such a way as to permit analysis to be conducted on two sep-
arate but concurrent levels; quantitatively and qualitative-
ly. The objective of this approach was to obtain a greater
depth of feeling about certain factors concerning retention,
and to solicit recommendations or comments from the partici-
pants on matters about which they felt strongly. The com-
ments submitted by the participants were reviewed and
analyzed qualitatively without the use of any statistical
techniques; the desire of the study designers was simply
to discover areas which may not have been covered by the
questionnaire, to highlight areas where further investiga-
tion might be justified, and to provide some means of cor-
roborating the findings of the quantitative analysis.
The first question in the questionnaire posed the re-
tention question to each participant, and caused each par-
ticipant to classify himself as "staying," "leaving," or
"undecided," with various degrees of inclination toward one
of these categories. The officer's declared service inten-
tion, based on the reply to this question, was then used as
the dependent variable in investigating the intrinsic, ex-
trinsic, and duty factors which affected him.
The principal analytic techniques used in the quantita-
tive analysis were canonical analysis, principal component
analysis, and the more conventional stepwise regression anal-
ysis. The canonical correlation analysis [Refs. 9 and 12]
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were conducted on correlation matrices of the extrinsic, in-
trinsic, and duty variables using the data from the three
groups of officers. Hypothesis testing by this method in-
dicated that interclass dependence does exist between these
variables, but the correlations between the variables were
so low and sensitive to extreme values that canonical vari-
ates could not be used in a predictive sense. Because of
these reasons, it was felt that the Hotelling principal
components technique [Ref. 8] would describe the dependen-
cies of the three types of variables (intrinsic, extrinsic,
and duty) in a manner more capable of interpretation.
The Hotelling principal components analysis were car-
ried out on the correlation matrices of the extrinsic and
intrinsic items and computed from the three groups ("stay-
ing," "leaving," and "undecided") of officers. A program
from the BIOMED Program Package [Ref. 11] was used in car-
rying out the analysis. First principal components were
used to determine the six extrinsic factors of lowest and
highest weights for each officer group. (As an example,
the "leaving" group seemed to place a higher value on ma-
terial success, such as promotion, housing, and pay, than
did the "staying" group)
.
The second principal components are in essence com-
parisons of the extrinsic and intrinsic scores of the offi-
cers, while third principal components consisted of
comparisons of certain favorable extrinsic Army benefits
and some of the less favorable aspects of Army life.
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The next use of principal components was in extracting
correlation matrices for extrinsic, intrinsic, and duties
variables for the three groups. As before, the various
principal components could be given an interpretation in-
dicating preferences shown by officers of the three groups.
While these relationships between the sets of variables
were being established, the study group also developed
stepwise regression models [Ref. 13] which measured the in-
trinsic effects, the extrinsic effects, and overview (fac-
tors not listed specifically in intrinsic or extrinsic
factors or the list of duties) effects in terms of reten-
tion. These three models provided some of the inputs to
the next model, an undecided stepwise regression model, de-
signed to analyze more closely how the Army might influence
the "undecided" officer.
Another undertaking of the study was the effort to es-
tablish relationships between certain socio-economic and
service status factors. The effect of each of these factors
on retention was measured using the non-parametric
Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Chi-square tests [Ref. 14] to test
the relationship. Some of these socio-economic factors in-
cluded source of commission, rank, branch, racial group,
father's occupation, and education level attained.
The result of all this preceding analysis was the de-
velopment of the Retention Model, which was the integration
of the previous modeling steps. The purpose of this model
was to investigate changes in retention resulting from changes
in those factors which are controllable. This model then led
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to a series of specific analyses of the significant vari-
ables discovered. The study revealed those intrinsic fac-
tors considered most important (i.e. sense of achievement,
sense of challenge, responsibility, independence) "and also
determined that these intrinsic needs are primarily satis-
fied by job content of duty assignments, and not by the
extrinsic factors such as pay, housing, and retirement.
Having encountered some success at identifying those
factors which have a significant effect on retention, the
study moved on to the next logical step, the question of
what effects various proposed Army actions would have on
retention. To this end, a Resource Allocation Model was
developed to predict retention and cost effects of new pro-
grams or policies. This model attempted to determine how
many officers might be retained, and the distribution of
these officers by rank, branch, marital status, and several
other profile items
.
The model analyzed the results of the study question-
naire section on "The effects of proposed changes in ex-
trinsic factors on career decisions." The effect of each
of these 48 proposed changes was measured and tabulated in
the form of a total of officers retained by this change.
However, it was realized that many of the responses to the
proposed changes reflected more wishful thinking than care-
fully weighed consideration on the part of the respondents
and therefore the choices of proposed changes were weighed




Based on the questionnaire answers, the Resource Allo-
cation Model proceeded in an iterative manner to accept
individuals into the "Staying" group of officers. The
analysis utilized a weighted probability function to help
determine the number of officers who would be expected to
join the "Staying" group as the result of some extrinsic
factor, considering different probabilities of this actu-
ally happening depending on whether the officer had pre-
viously been considered "Leaving" or "Undecided."
This weighted probability function was constructed to
measure the number of officers who would actually remain in
the service, given the number of officers indicating each of
the different career intentions. Recall that each officer
was asked to indicate his service intention and his answer
carried a numerical weight ranging from 1 ("I definitely in-
tend to leave active duty as soon as possible") up to 7 ("I
definitely intend to make a career in the Army"). Next, pro-
bability values were assigned to the percentage of officers
in each response category who would actually remain in the
Army. For example, the probability of staying in the Army,
given a "1" or "2" response, was assumed to be negligible
(1 percent) , but this probability was expected to increase
with increasing responses "3" through "6," and finally was
assumed to be not less than 85 percent and not more than 95
percent, a given a "7" response. Based on these assumptions,
maximum and minimum numbers of officers expected to stay in
the Army were computed for the extrinsic factors. In addi-
tion, techniques were introduced to reduce the "wish-list"
effect on each of the officer's responses.
33

One drawback experienced in this analysis was that of
ten extrinsic factors considered most important by the re-
spondents, five of them, including the top three, were re-
lated to duties, which was the most difficult area to deal
with from the resource allocation point of view. As an
example, the factor which had the greatest response was
"Utilize officers' assignment-preference statement to a
greater extent in actual assignment to duties." Because of
the rather general nature of this and other duties-related
responses, most of the model's analyses were run while ex-
cluding duties-related items. Thereafter, the factors in-
vestigated most thoroughly primarily concerned education
and allowances
.
The factors which seeemed most promising were then anal-
yzed in packages of three at a time and tabulated by profile
groups to assess their effects on numbers of officers re-
tained as a result of the incentive package. Further meth-
ods were introduced to reduce "wish list" effect which was
apparently inflating some of the response figures.
The result of analysis using this model was a fairly
consistent indication of areas of major interest to reten-
tion improvement. Implementation of programs to alleviate
problems in any and all of these areas was predicted to in-
crease junior officer retention from the present 181 to rates
in the range of 24-401, depending on which and how many of
the factors were implemented as programs or policy changes.
Returning to the validation study conducted using re-
sponses of officers recently separated from the Army, it was
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determined that the validation study was in close agreement
with results obtained through the Retention Model. The pro-
file of those separated officers most closely resembled the
profile of those officers who were grouped as "leaving" by
their stated intentions. No conclusion or recommendation
of the main study was amended as a result of these valida-
tion study findings.
The culmination of this analytic study was the Reten-
tion Model's representation of the junior officer as a de-
cision maker. The three career groups ("staying," "leaving,"
and "undecided") were characterized by certain factors which
were most significant in their decision making. These find-
ings, together with the knowledge of effects of proposed
changes provided by the Resource Allocation Model, were used
to develop the recommendations of this study. These recom-
mendations were categorized as major or minor. Each major
recommendation would be expected to influence the undecided
officer toward an Army career, while each minor recommenda-
tion would not on it's own influence an officer toward a
career, but taken cumulatively would be expected to exert
a staying influence on the undecided officer.
A total of 44 study recommendations were subsequently
approved by the Secretary of the Army and have been imple-
mented as Army policies [Ref. 15]. The majority of these
recommendations involved actions involving assignment of
duties, career counseling, education programs, information
programs for Army wives, housing programs, and improvements
in ROTC training. It should be noted that the study presented
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no major recommendations calling for increases in basic pay
or retirement benefits. Therefore, none of the accepted
recommendations of the study required the expenditure of
large sums of money, nor did any of the programs require




III. OFFICER GRADE STRUCTURE STUDIES
The purpose of this section is to investigate officer
grade structures and methods of improving upon current
structures. We first discuss some considerations as to
what constitutes an optimal grade structure. Next, the
current structures are discussed; how they were established,
what legal restrictions are imposed on the structures of
each of the armed services, and how these structures react
to changes in national or Department of Defense policy.
This section concludes with a review of a recent study, the
Officer Grade Structure Study
,
prepared by the Personnel
Studies Division, Directorate of Personnel Studies and Re-
search, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel,
Department of the Army. The study was published in March,
1969.
A. CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING AN OPTIMAL GRADE STRUCTURE
No clear cut method exists for determining an "optimal"
officer grade structure, primarily because no single criteria
exists for indicating when a structure is optimal. It would
be expected that the relationship between the size of the
total officer force and the total armed force of a service
is not linear. Additionally, officer distribution by rank
would vary as the size of the total officer force varies.
Finally, each of the services requires a different grade
structure to accomplish it's missions. Thus the form of the
optimal grade structure may be different for the Navy, Army,
37

Air Force, and Marine Corps, and this structure for each
service will change as the total size and mission of the
service changes.
In the absence of a criteria for determining optimality,
the services have resorted to the development of guidelines
for acceptability and desirability to judge the proposed of-
ficer grade structure. When utilizing guidelines of this
type, proposed new structures are judged on their accept-
ability or desirability as seen from the present structure.
The problem of how to move from the present structure to a
proposed new structure plays a major role in evaluating the
new structure. For example, suppose the present Navy grade
structure contains 6500 Aviation Lieutenant Commanders, and
a new structure is proposed which requires only 5000 Avia-
tion Lieutenant Commanders to accomplish it's mission in
the near future. This new structure may have many advan-
tages over the former, but it has one undesirable feature.
There will exist 1500 officers in excess of requirements.
These officers are in the middle of their careers , have
been trained at a considerable expense, and now have sud-
denly become unneeded. This presents the Navy with a pro-
blem of sustaining an effective and efficient fighting force
while still providing adequate career security to its offi-
cers. Problems of this sort must be recognized and addres-
sed when proposing changes in the officer grade structure.
The following are guidelines of acceptability, or con-





(1) Meet mission requirements in terms of total offi-
cer strength and officer strength in each grade at each time
period.
(2) Be an acceptable structure in the view of planners
and policy makers.
(3) Be acceptable to prospective members of the Offi-
cer Corps, to attain the required retention by permitting
service careers to be attractive.
(4) Be sustainable through the planned time frame.
(5) Be attainable from the current grade structure,
allowing for some acceptable time for transition and some
level of disruption to those presently in the structure.
(6) Conform to current laws and Department of Defense
guidelines in reaching prescribed limits within acceptable
transition times.
Certain desirable features are also expected from a
proposed officer structure. These features can be looked
upon as objectives of the proposed structure, and include
the following:
(1) The structure must provide qualified officers in
sufficient numbers to meet national objectives in time of
war
.
(2) It must be flexible enough to expand and adjust
to changing force levels and short term policy changes.
(3) It must provide continuous intake of junior of-
ficers, and provide for realistic retention rates.
(4) It must utilize officer assets by retaining skil-
led career personnel and providing career opportunities which
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realize the skills and experience developed by these offi-
cers .
(5) It must allow an orderly promotion flow, follow-
ing a predictable pattern, for all age and grade groups.
(6) It must offer compensation through advancement
which will motivate the career officer while at the same
time remaining competitive at all stages of advancement.
(7) The structure must provide some type of quality
control in promotion and separation of officers.
(8) It must provide equality of opportunity to offi-
cers of all branches and components.
Finally, the structure should replace the present system
only when some significant advantage is clearly attainable.
These guidelines, in the forms of constraints and ob-
jectives, may not be the only criteria for determining an
optimal grade structure. However, they do provide a means
of judging any proposed structure against the existing sys-
tem. It should be recognized that some of the guidelines
may not always be consistent or compatible with each other,
and these inconsistencies require compromise and trade-off
in determining the value of a proposed grade structure.
B. CURRENT OFFICER GRADE STRUCTURES
Existing officer grade structures vary somewhat among
each of the armed services. For each service, the structure
is divided into cells containing the number of officers in
each grade and then further divided in accordance with each
service's organization. For example, the Navy Officer Corps
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is categorized by unrestricted line, restricted line, staff
corps, and limited duty officers, while the Army Officer
Corps is categorized into five groups: Regular Army Career
Officers, Other than Regular Army (OTRA) Career Officers,
Regular Army Junior Officers with less than five years ac-
tive federal commissioned service, OTRA officers with less
than five years active federal commissioned service, and
Recalled or Voluntary Active Duty Reservists.
Grade structures are then further broken down by branch
or by occupational designations (e.g. MOS) . The type of
breakdown varies from service to service, just as the branch
and MOS designations vary from service to service. Some of
these categories are arbitrarily established and manned by
the service; however, the number of officers permitted by
major category and rank for each service has been establish-
ed by legislative action.
Overall service officer strength and rank distribution
are basically governed by the provisions of Title 10, U.S.
Code (the Officer Personnel Act of 1947) [Ref. 6]. This
act provides ceilings on the total officer strength, based
on the enlisted strength of each service. The act also pre-
scribes a ceiling on the number of officers authorized within
certain ranks, as a function of the total officer strength.
The distribution of grades for the ranks of major (lieuten-
ant commander) and above is controlled by the Officer Grade
Limitation Act of 1954 (Public Law 83-349) [Ref. 7]. The
ceilings established by this law apply not only to the num-
ber of officers in each grade, but also breaks down the
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ceilings by branch (for the Navy, separate ceilings are
established for Line, Supply Corps, Civil Engineer Corps,
Medical Corps, Dental Corps, Medical Service Corps, Nurse
Corps, and Chaplain Corps). In actual practice, these
ceilings are seldom if ever met, and in the case of the
Navy, the Secretary of the Navy has established officer
strengths at the level roughly 101 below these statutory
ceilings. The limits established in this manner are called
"prescribed ceilings."
Legislative constraints affect the officer grade struc-
ture in another way also, and these constraints are applied
to promotion policies. The Officer Personnel Act of 1947
provides the officer promotion machinery for each of the
armed services. Among other things, this act establishes
categories of officers for promotion purposes, and from
these categories, zones of promotion are established. These
"promotion zones," as they are called, are established by
the service secretaries prior to the convening of the ap-
propriate promotion selection board. The size of the pro-
motion zone is a function of several factors such as (1) the
number of vacancies expected to exist in the next higher
grade, (2) a rough approximation of the desired promotion
rate (percentage of officers in the promotion zone to actu-
ally be selected for promotion) , and (3) the time in grade
for an officer in his present grade. The number of officers
to be promoted in a year is equal to the prescribed ceiling
for that grade minus the number of officers already in that
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grade plus the estimated number of vacancies which will oc-
cur in the following 12 months.
Promotion selection boards are not tightly bound to the
approximate promotion rate envisioned by the service secre-
taries; therefore actual promotion rates will vary somewhat
from year to year. In addition to considering officers in
the promotion zone already described, the selection boards
are authorized under the statutes of the Officer Personnel
Act of 1947 to select a certain percentage of the total
number of officers to be promoted from a "secondary" pro-
motion zone. This zone is composed of officers who are
considered for promotion ahead of their contemporaries, as
a result of their previous outstanding performance.
The manner in which promotion zones are established
and considered for selection varies among the services.
For example, the Navy and Marine Corps establish a pro-
motion zone, convene a selection board, and announce the
selection of officers for promotion in each grade on a fixed
schedule each year. However, the Army and Air Force convene
selection boards and establish promotion zones at irregular
intervals (up to three-year intervals in some cases) . These
boards are established when it appears that the service will
run out of officers who have been selected by the preceding
selection board for promotion to the next higher grade.
This discussion has pointed out the underlying reason
for the existence and operation of selection boards, and
for the variation in promotion selection rate from year to
year. Selection is used administratively to control promotions
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in accordance with the needs of the service, and as autho-
rized grade distribution will permit.
In the case of the Navy, legal constraints also es-
tablish a minimum number of years in each grade and hence
a minimum total commissioned service prior to becoming
eligible for promotion. Only the naval service operates
under these minimum times-in-grade constraints, and in some
cases these constraints have been suspended by executive
order.
One final legislative constraint, as established by
the Officer Personnel Act of 1947 (and incorporated into
Title 10, U.S. Code), acts on the existing grade structure.
This constraint concerns separation of officers in the grades
0-1, 0-2, and 0-3 twice failing selection for promotion to
the next higher grade. These officers are separated from
"the service. In the grades 0-4, 0-5, and 0-6, officers are
guaranteed a statutory retirement after a minimum of 20,
26, and 30 years, respectively, without regard to failure
of selection to the next higher grade.
All of the foregoing considerations in this section
represent constraints which have been established by law
and which can be changed only through further Congressional
action. Therefore, these constraints are generally consider-
ed to be fixed when conducting any analysis of changes in
officer grade structure resulting from introduction of new
policies. In proposing any new structure, one of the con-
siderations must address the problem of introducing and
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passing new Congressional legislation if such a proposed
structure exceeds the legal constraints presently in exis-
tence. This could prove to be the most difficult step in
the process of implementing a new officer grade structure.
C. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, OFFICER GRADE STRUCTURE STUDY
This section presents a review of the Officer Grade
Structure Study [Ref . 5] , prepared by the Personnel Studies
Division, Directorate of Personnel Studies and Research,
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Depart-
ment of the Army. The study presents an investigation of
the Army officer structure, and was published in March,
1969. The overall classification of the study is SECRET,
but only UNCLASSIFIED portions are used in this paper.
The purpose of this study was to establish a sustain-
able officer structure for the Army through the 1975-1985
time frame. The general objectives of the study were:
[Ref. 5]
"(1) To develop an officer structure which will be
capable of providing, both in quantity and quality, the
military leadership needed by the Active Army to carry out
it's assigned missions from now through 1985.
(2) To develop an officer structure which will be
career attractive and sustainable regardless of officer
strength fluctuations."
The specific objectives of the study were:
"(1) To determine officer requirements in terms of an




(2) To develop a practical means of adjusting to
fluctuating force levels, including a possible post-hos-
tilities phasedown, concurrently maintaining required
quantitative and qualitative levels and acceptable career
development.
(3) To recommend improvements of policies and pro-
grams within the personnel management functions which in-
fluence the officer structure.
(4) To determine whether legislative changes or Office
of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) program changes are re-
quired to attain and support the officer structure developed
in this study."
The study focused attention on Active Army officer re-
quirements, distribution of experience levels in light of
anticipated roles and missions, sustainment capabilities at
an acceptable level of officer quality, and provisions for
satisfying career progression for officers. The study did
not investigate warrant officer career management, branch
and MOS assignments, and personnel readiness. As an output,
the study developed alternative officer baselines 1 , using
guidance from the Five Year Defense Program (FYDP) , Joint




A "baseline" is defined as "the Active Army end strength
considered to be the minimum required to meet normal peacetime
missions; a relatively stable end strength from which the Army
can expand in the event of hostilities or other national emer-
gency and to which the Army would contract upon resumption of
normal peacetime conditions." [Ref. 5]
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Estimate (BASE) , Army Force Development Plan (AFDP) , Army
85 Concept Study, and T-day planning guidance.
The study group expended considerable effort investi-
gating the factors bearing on the grade structure problem.
Force planning and personnel management influences were
considered; and careerist content and it's implications were
carefully defined. Several models were developed and com-
bined with the current force authorizations data to develop
a best estimate baseline, and a smaller alternative base-
line for testing. Then, to improve flexibility and per-
tinence of the study to the strength range within which
future decisions might take place, several additional al-
ternative baselines were developed for testing and considera-
tion.
Before developing the actual grade structure, the study
group recognized that no criteria for an optimal structure
existed, and thus certain aspects of acceptability and de-
sirability were investigated. These aspects resemble those
presented in Section IV "A" of this paper, and they served
as guidelines in judging the relative merits of the dif-
ferent proposed structures.
The keystone to this study is the Officer Grade Struc-
ture Model (OGSM) . This computer-assisted model was developed
to perform both the qualitative and quantitative analysis re-
quired to develop sustainable officer structures in response
to sets of policy constraints and conditions . The OGSM con-
siders officer strength by grade, attrition rates, promotion
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rates, time in grade, and procurement. The model was de-
veloped under the concept of tying together the factors
affecting officer grade structure. It was supplemented
with a mathematical model to specify the computations re-
quired, and finally joined with a computer model to fa-
cilitate repetitive operations of the mathematical model.
The OGSM analyses three characteristics of the offi-
cer grade structure; grade, time in grade, and active
federal commissioned service. The inputs (parameters) of
the model are:
(1) Grade strength authorization.
(2) Promotion selection rates to the next higher
grade
.
(3) Time in grade for each grade (promotion points)
.
(4) Attrition rates for each grade, defined as losses
other than voluntary separations, resignations upon comple-
tion of initial two-year obligated service, retirement at
20 years service, and voluntary separation after failure
of promotion.
(5) If desired, the expected retention rates at two
and twenty years of service.
The outputs of the model are:
(1) A three-dimensional set of grade strength re-
quirements, presenting the requirements by grade, time in
service, and active federal commissioned service.
(2) Required procurement rates for second lieutenants
(3) Three-year, five-year, and ten-year retention
rates which will be required to sustain this structure.
48

(4) Two-year and twenty-year retention rates, if they
were not provided as inputs.
(5) The number of officers over or short of actual
present officer strength that is required to maintain the
proposed structure.
Thus, in summary, the model uses the inputs previously
listed and for each set of inputs calculates the require-
ments for sustainability of the structure, overages, under-
ages by grade, retention rates at different career points,
and the necessary six-month procurement rate of second lieu-
tenants to sustain this proposed structure.
The mathematical basis for the model is linear program-
ming. In this type of optimization problem, the grade
strength authorization inputs are treated as goals to be
attained "as-closely-as-possible," given the promotion points,
promotion rates, and attrition rates. The problem is formu-
lated as follows
:
Minimize: CX + DY + EZ (1)
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j = 1,2,...., 6 (periods of length of active federal
commissioned service (AFCS)), (j = 1 represents 0<AFCS<2,
j = 2 represents 2<AFCS<3, j = 3 represents 3<AFCS<5, j = 4
represents 5<AFCS<10, j = 5 represents 10<AFCS<20, and
j = 6 represents 20<AFCS) . See Figure 1.
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Thus, equation (1) represents the objective function,
with the objective of minimizing total cost of procuring
and retaining the desired officer structure while keeping
costs of overages and underages low. Equation (2) is sim-
ply an inventory equation, while equation (3) requires de-
creasing cohort size in increasing time periods, and
equation (4) represents an additional constraint on the
overages allowed for field grade officers.
This problem is formulated in a somewhat different
form in Appendices I and II to Annex A of Reference 5, the
Officer Grade Structure Study . In Ref. 5, the constraints
on overages of officers in the field grades are formulated
in a manner different from equation (4) of this paper.
These constraints are formulated in such a way as to permit
overage for a particular grade to exceed .05b., the autho-
rization for that grade. Equation (4) will not permit any
overage of this type.
The cost coefficients C, D, and E deserve further ex-
planation. These coefficients are assigned a value prior
to solving the model, and the values assigned to each ele-
ment are arbitrarily established by the planner or policy
maker operating the model. Then, with these assigned cost
coefficient values, the model proceeds to generate a solu-
tion with the goal of minimizing authorization overage or
underages for each grade. The cost coefficients actually
used in the operation of the model were: (ci ,c 2 , . . . ,c 6 ) = 1,
(di,d 2 ,d 3 ) = 1, (d 4 ,d5,d 6 ) = 4, and (ei,e 2 , ,e 6 ) = 4. It
should be kept in mind that a change in those cost coefficients
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could create a solution which differs considerably from the
solution obtained using the coefficient values listed above.
This goal programming model is then solved using stan-
dard linear programming codes [Ref. 10]. The grade struc-
ture obtained in this method in interpreted as the result
of procuring x x men at time zero and tracing their careers
for an entire 30-year period with given promotion points,
promotion rates, and attrition rates. Each period in ser-
vice, across all grades, lists how this group of Xi men is
distributed throughout the 30-year period, usually referred
to as a "service distribution."
Among the model inputs , the parameters of promotion
selection rate and time in grade offer the primary means
for controlling the resulting structure in a positive man-
ner. These effects were demonstrated through the use of
the model, and they present a readily usable tool to the
personnel manager, especially during periods of expansion
and contraction of the officer structure. The structure was
shown to be highly sensitive to even minor adjustments in
time in grade, and moderately sensitive to adjustments in
promotion rates. Sensitivity analysis of these two variables
can be conducted by the planner and the general method of
arriving at the optimal structure consists of making initial
adjustments by changing the time in grade, and then using
the promotion rate variable as a fine tuning mechanism.
At this stage, two points of criticism of the model are
in order. First, there appear to be errors in the formula-
tion of the mathematical model. Appendix II to Annex A of
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the Officer Grade Structure Study contains the basic mathe-
matical derivations used in developing values for the P(I,J)




(l + a)n C5)
where a is the number of second lieutenants remaining at
the end of their obligated tour of n six-month periods, X
is the rate at which second lieutenants are procured per
six-month time period, and during the period these second
lieutenants were lost at a rate a (0<a<l) per six-month
period. In fact, the equation for determining the number





= X(l-a) n (6)
An example will illustrate the difference between the two
equations. For a single six-month period, let a = 1.0
(i.e. 100% attrition; all X second lieutenants are lost).
Equation (6) correctly shows that a\ = at the end of that
single period. However, equation (5), the one used in Ap-
pendix II, shows that ai = X/2 officers remain, and this
is clearly not correct.
The second point of criticism involves the apparent
failure of the model to utilize duality. The dual variables
could be used to tell the relative prices of the constraints
(overages, underages, etc.). Shadow prices could help the
planner or policy maker determine how binding each of the
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constraints is, and could be helpful in determining which
of the constraints could be most profitably changed in at-
tempting to further minimize the objective function.
All of the conceptual and technical developments of
this study group lead to the use of the OGSM to develop
structures to be recommended to the Secretary of the Army
for each of seven branch test strengths which might con-
ceivably be imposed on the Army in the next decade. These
different test strengths were obtained from various policy
guidance decisions which would affect the size of the Army
in the 1975-1985 time frame. Some 2500 runs of the OGSM
were executed in conducting the iterations to arrive at
structures which best satisfied these policy directives and
still met the criteria of acceptability and desirability.
The detailed picture of each of these seven structures was
presented as a separate, classified volume of this study
report. For each of these structures, the presentation
included a detailed cell-by-cell and total content of the
structure recommended, distributed by categories of early,
normal, and late promotions in the grades second lieutenant
through colonel, and by amount of commissioned service with-
in each grade. Additionally, the report presented the spe-
cific promotion rates applicable to each officer group within
each grade, and the applicable retention rates for officers
in each group who were not selected for promotion.
The final area of analysis by the study group centered
about a comparison of the seven structures developed. The
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objective of this analysis was to choose the most desirable
structure, considering the prime factors of capability of
expansion of each structure, readiness implications (i.e.
maintaining military preparedness) , and the impact on the
Officer Corps during any phasedown. Each of the seven
structures was felt to be sustainable; therefore, based on
the factors considered above, the largest of the seven
structures was deemed to be most preferred by the study
group. The recommendations of the study group presented
this finding, along with several alternative baseline of-
ficer structures which would be recommended if policy di-
rectives establishing smaller Army end strengths were
implemented
.
In summary, it is worthwhile to review the capabilities
and limitations of the Officer Grade Structure Model. The
model is capable of:
(1) Designing an officer grade structure with or with-
out legislative, force structure, or any other single con-
straint, which best satisfies the Army's manning and
readiness objectives.
(2) Determining weaknesses in existing promotion pol-
icies by demonstrating their predicted long-term effects.
(3) Projecting problems which can be expected to occur
over the long term based on current promotion and retention
rates, grade strengths, times in grade, retirement rates,
and constant input rates.
(4) Determining the approximate retention rates neces-
sary for long term sustainment of officer grade strengths.
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(5) Displaying the "ideal" grade distribution by time
in grade and time in commissioned service for the Army and/
or each branch.
Limitations exist in the model's ability to approximate
the situation as it exactly exists. Some of the limitations
are:
(1) The OGSM is a static solution model, and is valid
only as long as present policies and input data continue to
apply. Therefore, any change in management goals over time
will diminish the value of the output. Since some of the
policy inputs, such as end strength figures, attrition, and
retention rates cannot be positively controlled by the Army,
the "ideal" structure requires repeated updating.
(2) The OGSM does not efficiently adjust to changing
force levels, because it is not able to provide for conver-
sion from the present structure to any new structure.
(3) The model only approximates promotion zones, since
it specifies time in grade and time-blocks in six-month in-
tervals when in fact promotion and attrition occur and can
be regulated by the day. An obviously more complex program-
ming modification could overcome this limitation.
(4) The "ideal" or "optimal" structure generated by
the model may by neither ideal nor optimal, since it is
simply a modification of the present structure in accordance
with certain rules assigning costs to overages and underages
in certain grades and then further analyzed in light of
certain rules for acceptability and desirability.
56

The study group also realized most of these limitations
and pointed out that this first generation model could serve
as a base for a more sophisticated (perhaps dynamic) model
which might overcome many of the shortcomings now existing.
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